He who has an ear, let him hear what the Spirit says to the churches. (Rev.2:3) |
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-2337
SAMUEL L. EDWARDS, et al. Appellants, v. JANE HOLMES DIXON Appellee.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Southern Division, at Greenbelt
BRIEF OF SAMUEL L. EDWARDS AND THE WARDENS AND VESTRY OF CHRIST CHURCH, ST. JOHN’S PARISH, ACCOKEEK, MARYLAND STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION This case arose on Appellee Jane Dixon’s claim of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332. Samuel L. Edwards and the Wardens and Vestry of Christ Church, St. John’s Parish, Accokeek, Maryland (hereafter "Appellants") challenged jurisdiction below. On October 29, 2001, the District Court granted summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction in favor of Appellee. On November 2, 2001 appellants filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal based upon 28 U.S.C. §1291, which gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction from final decisions of the District Courts. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE On June 25, 2001, Jane Dixon, an individual, filed suit against Rev. Samuel Edwards and the Vestry of St. John’s Parish in Accokeek Maryland. The suit, brought under 28 U.S.C. §1321 sought declaratory judgment: a) that she or her delegate has the right to be present in the buildings and on the grounds of St. John’s Parish and to perform her duties as Bishop and Rector Ex Officio there; and that her actions on May 27, 2001 did not, and similar future actions by her or her delegate will not, constitute trespass (Count I); b) that she has a right to preside at meetings of the Vestry of St. John’s Parish and the Parish of St. John’s (Count I); c) that the purported contract between the Vestry of St. John’s Parish and Father Edwards for him to serve as Rector of the Parish is invalid and without effect (Count II); d) that the acts of the Vestry in contracting with Father Edwards to be and holding him out as Rector of St. John’s Parish and preventing Bishop Dixon from presiding at Vestry meetings and performing other acts as Rector Ex Officio are ultra vires and of no force and effect (Count III); e) that, under the Maryland Vestry Act, 1976 Md. Laws Ch. 96, § 312J, Father Edwards is not Rector of Christ Church (Count IV); and f) that, under the Maryland Vestry Act, 1976 Md. Laws. Ch. 96, § 312G, Father Edwards is unlawfully using and occupying the buildings and property of St. John’s Parish (Count V). Dixon moved for an preliminary injunction on July 6, 2001. On that same date, Rev. Edwards and the Vestry moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, standing and diversity on the part of Jane Dixon. Plaintiff Dixon then filed a memorandum in support of summary judgment on July 20, 2001. Hearing on all motions was held before the District Court on August 23, 2001. The Court entered summary judgment for Jane Dixon on October 29, 2001. The Opinion and Order included, inter alia, a declaration that:
The Court then entered the following injunction
Dixon v. Edwards, et al., Civil No. PJM 01-1838 (October 29, 2001) (hereafter "Opinion") (Emphasis supplied) Joint Appendix ("JA) at 882. Notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was filed on November 2, 2001. That same date, Appellants’ filed a Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal and for Expedition with the District Court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62. This Motion did not request a modification of the Court’s order of injunction, but sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal. Following a telephone conference with the District Court on November 6, 2001,1 the parties agreed to extend the date until November 30, 2001 by which Fr. Edwards and his family would vacate the Edwards’ home, and the Court entered an Order to this effect following a separate consent motion. Appellee filed an Opposition to the motion for stay on November 16, 2001, and Appellant filed their Reply on November 20, 2001. The Court issued an Opinion on November 21, 2001, stating that the stay was granted in part and denied in part. In fact, the Order appears to be a modification of the October 29, 2001 injunction from which this appeal was taken. The November 21st Order provides: ORDERED that:
Appellants then sought a stay pending appeal from this Court on November 26, 2001 pursuant to F.R.A.P. 8. This Court denied the stay, but ordered expedited briefing on the substantive issues by Order dated November 30, 2001.
Christ Church, Accokeek called Rev. Samuel Edwards to be its Rector after a lengthy search process that took more than two years. The call was conducted according to Canon III.17 of the national Canons of the Episcopal Church USA, the Maryland Vestry Act and the guidelines from the Diocese of Washington of the Episcopal Church. See JA-164 ( ¶9); JA-182 (¶9). On December 13, 2000, Christ Church called Rev. Samuel Edwards as rector of their parish. It gave prompt notice of its intent to call Rev. Edwards to Bp. Haines, the then-bishop of the Diocese of Washington, and Bp. Dixon, the Bishop Suffragan of that diocese, in writing. See JA-164 ( ¶11); JA-182 (¶11); JA-57. Bp. Haines retired as Diocesan Bishop effective December 31, 2000, and Appellee assumed the role of Ecclesiastical Authority pursuant to operation of Diocesan Canon. See JA-57. Despite knowledge of the identity of the candidate, despite the availability of Rev. Edwards’ teachings, and despite the thirty days allowed by canon for objection, neither Bp. Haines nor Appellee raised a timely objection to the call of Appellant Edwards. See JA-164 (¶13); JA-182 (¶13). On January 22, 2001, after the expiration of the thirty day period, the Vestry gave written notice to Appellee of its intent to exercise its canonical and statutory power to contract with Rev. Edwards. Appellee raised no objection to Rev. Edwards’ qualifications or moral character. See JA-164 (¶14); JA-182 (¶14); JA-221. The Vestry entered into a contract for clergy employment with Rev. Edwards. As well, the Vestry negotiated a separate residential lease with Rev. Edwards for the use and occupancy of the Rectory as a matter separate and apart from its employment arrangement. Appellee asked for an interview with Rev. Edwards, an interview not required under canon, but did not indicate any problem with the call. The interview took place on February 26, 2001 as scheduled by mutual agreement between Appellee and Appellant Edwards. The only comment offered by Bp. Dixon to the Vestry regarding the election of the Rector was that Rev. Edwards was possessed of the "highest integrity and honesty." Another thirty (30) days had passed at this point, and the Vestry, acting in accordance with the Vestry Acts and Canon, contracted with Rev. Edwards on February 6, 2001. See JA-164-65 (¶¶16-17); JA-183 (¶15-16); JA-171 (¶13); JA-224. On March 6, 2001, Bp. Dixon telephoned Rev. Edwards and advised him that she "would not call him" to Christ Church, despite the fact that the call of clergy is the province of the Vestry under Canon and Maryland law and not within the power or authority of the diocesan bishop. She offered him one day to "withdraw" from his call despite the existence of a valid contract with the parish. See JA-165 (¶18); JA-183 (¶18); JA-171 (¶14); JA-229. On March 8, 2001, Bishop Dixon issued a letter to the Vestry refusing to license Rev. Edwards despite the a lapse of nearly ninety (90) days following the call and a complete absence of adverse information in the background investigation. Between March 8, 2001, and May 27, 2001, Appellants repeatedly sought to have Appellee desist from her wilful disregard for the Canons of the Episcopal Church concerning the call of clergy. See JA-233-263. Appellee refused. Nine bishops of the Episcopal Church wrote to Appellee asking that she desist from her violation of the Canons of the Church, but to no avail. Appellee persisted in her interference with the life and operation of the parish and in the contract between the Vestry and Rev. Edwards. JA 264-273. On May 15, 2001, five Bishops of the Episcopal Church met with the Presiding Bishop of the Church, Rt. Rev. Frank Griswold, to discuss a resolution of the conflict which was described as a "microcosm" of the larger issues that plague the Episcopal Church. JA-274. Efforts by the Presiding Bishop proved unsuccessful. On May 22, 2001, owing to the continuing disregard of the Canons of the Church by Appellee, the Vestry sought protection from another bishop of the Episcopal Church until a resolution of the growing conflict could be found. JA-276. On May 26, Rt. Rev. Jack Leo Iker, Bishop of the Diocese of Ft. Worth, placed St. John’s Parish under his episcopal protection. Affidavit of Barbara Sturman at JA-165-166 (¶22-23); JA-278. That protection continues. On May 27, 2001, Appellee entered upon the property of Christ Church, Accokeek, the main portion of St. John’s Parish–not to make a pastoral visit, but with an intent to oust Rev. Edwards and take over the worship service. The Senior Warden of the Vestry advised Appellee that she was welcome to worship in the church, but that there was a duly elected Rector already conducting divine services in the sanctuary. See JA-166 (¶24). Appellee, a number of Diocesan officials, and some twenty parish members, moved to an outdoor basketball court on the grounds of the Parish to conduct an alternate service to that being held by Rev. Edwards. Rt. Rev. Edward MacBurney, a retired Episcopal bishop and a current member of the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church, read to Appellee and the public the letter of Bishop Iker granting the Parish protection. Appellee then was asked by members of the Vestry to cease her activities–an unscheduled impromptu service during the scheduled Mass--on the grounds of Christ Church. She refused and continued the alternative service unimpeded by the Vestry. See JA-166 (¶25); JA-172 (¶21). On July 13, 2001, the requisite number of bishops filed ecclesiastic charges alleging that Appellee "has consistently and intentionally acted contrary to the spirit and letter of the Constitution and Canons of the General Convention, by exceeding the thirty (30) day limit for objecting to the call of a rector by a parish and has rebuked and recanted several reconciliation efforts by the Parish prayerfully undertaken in the context of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ’s teachings, including those revealed in Matthew 18:15-20, which establish the framework for ecclesiastical courts." JA-286. They asked for "their Presiding Bishop and his designated Review Panel of Bishops making inquiry if the Episcopal Church in fact permits its bishops to exert a veto over the selection by a Parish of a new rector prayerfully called to be its rector in accordance with the Canons of the Episcopal Church." A similar Complaint was made by clergy and laity in the Diocese of Washington. On September 13, 2001, the Title IV Review Committee dealing with the canonical charges against Appellee issued a decision declining to proceed against her canonically. The decision of the Review Panel raised significant issues with respect to the contract between Rev. Samuel Edwards and the Vestry. The findings of the Review Panel specifically note that:
In the Matter of the Right Rev’d Jane Holmes Dixon, Report of the Review Committee (Sept. 11, 2001) at 4 (emphasis added) JA-855. While the Review Panel found that Appellee Dixon’s actions were not contrary to "definitive canonical authority" to warrant ecclesiastical discipline, the Panel noted that the opposite view, the one held by Appellants, is based on a good faith interpretation of canon. Id. Accordingly, the Panel effectively gave weight to the Vestry’s position that their contract with Rev. Edwards is based upon a good faith reading of the operating rules of the Episcopal Church and is valid. With respect to Rev. Samuel Edwards, on May 29, 2001, a group of clergy from the Diocese of Washington filed ecclesiastical charges against Rev. Samuel Edwards with the Diocese. See JA-280. These charges–and the question of the propriety of Rev. Edwards’ actions-were referred to the Diocese of Fort Worth, the diocese which retains ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Fr. Edwards. The charges are still pending in the diocese of Ft. Worth, with an initial decision anticipated in late December 2001. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT At the heart of the case is the fact that the District Court’s opinion and order pertain to ecclesiastical and religious matters and pending disciplinary proceedings within the Episcopal Church. These proceedings should have been allowed to conclude without intervention by the Court. The very nature of these matters places them beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts and, concomitantly, the injunctive power of those courts. To interfere in this process has placed the District Court in the position of an arbiter of religious doctrine in contravention of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The District Court has intervened directly in a dispute in which the internal rules (known as "Canons") of the Episcopal Church address each and every matter Appellee alleged in her complaint. In doing so, the Court has erred not only by finding jurisdiction, but also in ignoring the existence of genuine issues of material fact and by making credibility determinations against the Appellants in contravention of the summary judgment standard. Additionally, the court has entered a judgment evicting Appellant Edwards and his family from their home despite the existence of a Maryland residential lease agreement that was not the subject of this action, but of which the District Court was made aware. At the very least, a recent Review Panel decision of the Episcopal Church raised significant issues–issues that precluded summary judgment and injunction. As well, there are additional questions of material fact concerning the nature and extent of the Vestry’s right to use property it holds in fee simple, the nature of the polity of the Episcopal Church and the effect it has on the call of clergy, and whether Rev. Edwards and the Vestry entered into a contract in good faith. On this latter issue, Appellants believe that the ecclesiastic process gives rise to potential causes of action for a counterclaim against Appellee for interference in contract, but that the issue cannot be determined until ecclesiastic remedies have been exhausted.. Thus, Appellants have been summarily deprived of their ability to obtain redress on their contract claims by the District Court’s action, highlighting the problematic nature of considering jurisdiction until the conclusion of the Episcopal Church’s internal disciplinary process. Finally, this Court issued equitable relief barring Appellant Edwards from conducting religious services on property over which Appellee claims a right of entry, but in undefined areas "near" that property. In doing so, the Court erred as a matter of law under the Establishment Clause and Expression Clauses of the U. S. Constitution. The District Court attempted to modify the Constitutional infirmities in its order after this appeal was taken, although this does not offset the problems created by the original order. Appellant Rev. Edwards remains enjoined from conducting "religious services" 300 feet from property belonging to the other Appellants who, as title holders in fee simple, may use their parish property as they see fit. Moreover, the District Court has now claimed to enjoin Rev. Edwards from holding himself "out as being licensed by the Ecclesiastical Authority of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington."3 Apart from the fact that there was no evidence of record that Rev. Edwards ever made such representations, the District Court has now placed itself in the role of determining licensure issues of Episcopal clergy. Thus, the Court has exacerbated the deficiencies in its original decision in an ex post facto attempt to remedy those problems.
Review of a District Court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo. See World-Wide Rights Limited Partnership v. Combe, Inc., 955 F.2d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 1991); Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). Rule 56(c) provides that a grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, discovery answers and affidavits "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See also Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Pulliam Investment Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). In determining the existence of any genuine issues of material fact, "credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
A central issue in this appeal concerns whether the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Jane Dixon and its concomitant refusal to dismiss on the question of subject matter jurisdiction run afoul of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Canada v. Milivojevich,4 and its related cases.5 These cases articulate and develop the doctrine of deference in internal church disputes to the internal decisions of the church itself as set forth in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (132 Wall.) 679 (1871). In Watson, the Court enunciated a broad doctrine of judicial deference to the internal decision-making bodies of a church. Id. at 726-27. Under this rule of deference, whenever questions of discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest church judicatory, civil tribunals must accept such decisions as binding upon them. Id. at 727.6 According to the Court in Watson, the rule of deference preserves the separation of church and state by allowing religious associations to decide questions of religious belief, church discipline and ecclesiastical government without state interference.7 Subsequently, in Milivojevich, supra, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of an Illinois court because the decision rested upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of the Serbian Orthodox church–a church found to be hierarchical in polity--on issues relating to the suspension and removal of a bishop. The Supreme Court held that the Illinois court had impermissibly substituted its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes by reversing the action of the orthodox church’s ecclesiastic tribunals. The decision quoted extensively from Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church,8 as follows:
The Supreme Court concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the First Amendment requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding on them.9 Assuming arguendo that the Episcopal church is hierarchical, the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Judicial intervention would necessarily encroach upon the decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunal in the Diocese of Ft. Worth upon the issues in dispute. Currently, charges against Rev. Edwards by clergy in the Diocese of Washington, as well as by Appellee, remain pending in the Ft. Worth ecclesiastical court. A decision of that court could either result in the action Appellee has initially obtained from the trial Court-the condemnation of Rev. Edwards’ and the Vestry’s actions–or a vindication of the same. It is, however, within the ambit of the Church and not the Federal courts. Applying Jones v. Wolf, supra, these are questions of "ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" that have not yet been decided by the highest of "church judicatories to which the matter has been carried."10 Accordingly, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case, and should have dismissed the action rather than granting summary judgment 11 The rule of deference to decisions of hierarchical church bodies is a corollary of the principle, derived from the First Amendment, of avoiding entanglement in the internal affairs of religious organizations. The District Court’s reliance upon Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) in this regard is misplaced for this case militates in favor of non-interference. First, in Gonzalez, the Supreme Court was concerned with "[t]he corporate existence of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the position occupied by the Papacy, has always been recognized by the Government of the United States." Id. citing Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S. 296 (1908).12 The case at bar does not involve the Roman Catholic Church, but the Episcopal Church–a church that is constitutional, collegial and conciliar in nature. This point, on which the District Court simply opted to make credibility determinations among various experts, has everything to do, inter alia, with how duly-qualified clergy move from one diocese to another and the comity to which their qualifications are entitled by virtue of the Episcopal Church’s structure.13 This issue is squarely involved in an ongoing ecclesiastic action in Ft. Worth. Should the decision of the church tribunal be favorable to Rev. Edwards, there is the possibility of a conflict in the decisions of two church tribunals, both with claim to authority in the matter. This will be a matter for resolution within the church. Indeed, the Court in Gonzalez pointed out that Watson v. Jones, supra, relied upon the "implied consent" of "all who unite themselves to such a body" to submit to ecclesiastical government such as the church’s disciplinary process. This holds not only for membership, but also for officers such as bishops in positions to exercise "ecclesiastical authority." The Supreme Court further pointed out that "The courts have likewise held, and the policy of our government of noninterference in religious matters requires, that in any event an appeal to the ecclesiastical authorities for redress must first be taken, if available, before a civil court will intervene." Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at (citations omitted.) Such a mechanism exists in this case and is in use. It should not have been usurped by the District Court. Yet, the District Court, by resorting to credibility assessments, had first to find the existence of a hierarchy by rejecting an "excursus by [appellants’] canon law experts" the lower court found "sharply at odds with major historical currents." Opinion at 25. Instead, ignoring evidence of record that the constitutional nature of the Episcopal Church is subject to change, and contrary evidence from Jane Dixon’s predecessor that the church is not hierarchical, the District Court buttressed its decision by selecting testimony from Dixon’s expert that the bishop is at the "apex" of the Episcopal Church hierarchy. Id. at 31. Arguably, the District Court is not deferring to Episcopal Church USA polity but imposing a new polity foreign to Episcopal Church USA on that group, much less deferring to existing ecclesiastic bodies. A central issue is, then, whether there has been an "exhaustion of ecclesiastical remedies" so that the case is amenable to jurisdiction. In Milivojevich, supra, the Court citing language from Watson provides the succinct answer:
Milivojevich at 711 (emphasis supplied). The District Court's deference to the decision of an executive agent of a diocese of the Episcopal Church USA deprives the other parties involved, notably Rev. Edwards, of the right to have the matter resolved by the appropriate ecclesiastical tribunal–that currently underway in Ft. Worth. In addition, it allows a member of the religious body, Jane Dixon, simply to resort to the secular courts before a decision of the ecclesiastical polity has been reached. It is a decision that is not sustainable.
Closely tied to the question of jurisdiction is the fact that the District Court necessarily violated the standard for summary judgment As noted above, a motion for summary judgment may be granted if:
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party's initial burden is to demonstrate to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Pulliam Investment Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). In this case, Appellants articulated before the District Court a series of material facts that are very much in dispute. These range from the status and effect of pending ecclesiastic court proceedings against Appellant Rev. Edwards, to the nature of the structure and polity of the Episcopal Church. In this instance, the Court simply selected Appellee’s version of the facts, and discounted or ignored the affidavits of Appellants’ expert witnesses. Op. at 31-33.14 In essence, the Court has opted, through the vehicle of summary judgment, to view the facts in the light most favorable to the moving party, at a point at which facts still are being developed in a pending diocesan church court proceeding. Nowhere is the improper weighing of evidence by the lower court more evident than on the issue of the nature of the Episcopal Church’s polity which, as the Court noted in its November 21, 2001 Order, has been "the issue." Order at 4; JA-925. In addition to the extensive affidavits of two experts, Appellants articulated evidence that, as a constitutional church, Episcopal Church USA’s polity is a matter subject to change. JA-187-198; 201-220; 665-681. This is a matter apparently agreed to by Ronald Haines, retired Bishop of Washington and Appellee’s predecessor, in evidence placed before the Court as well as by the national chancellor of the church in testimony read into the Court record. Yet, the Court simply selected Appellee’s competing version of the facts, and discounted or ignored the affidavits of Appellants’ expert witnesses.15 Jane Dixon maintained, and the District Court found, that in her view of the Episcopal Church, she is the final law and word on matters involving clergy call. Appellee claims that the Episcopal Church is a hierarchy that, within the Diocese of Washington, ends absolutely with her. However, the decision of a diocesan bishop as to a priest’s licensure is not the end of the matter as suggested by Dixon and found by the Court below. If the bishop has violated, or is violating the canons of Episcopal Church USA by his or her refusal to license, that bishop may be subject to discipline within the Church structure. JA-665-681. More importantly, there is an existing mechanism for the church to deal with a clergyman such as Rev. Edwards if he acted improperly. As a denomination that arises from the Protestant Reformation, the Episcopal Church’s structure does not vest its bishops with the plenipotentiary powers Plaintiff claims. Id. (¶3). Appellee Dixon is a bishop in a constitutional church which includes laity in the governing structure, and gives the laity rights that are enforceable within the church. Because of the laity’s virtually exclusive role on temporal matters, it is the laity that has a right of redress before the civil magistrate. See Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, Article XXXVII. The District Court further begs the question with the claim that "[d]espite an excursus by their canon law experts.... that Defendants cannot seriously contend" that the Episcopal Church is non-hierarchical. Opinion at 25. Despite this blithe dismissal, the information presented in the Appellants’ submissions to the trial court does, indeed, "genuinely dispute" that the Episcopal Church is hierarchical. The evidence shows that the Episcopal Church possesses a mixed polity, under which all of its members, including bishops, are governed by the Constitution and Canons of the Church. Indeed, Appellee’s predecessor, Rt. Rev. Ronald Haines, has made public statements to this effect. There can be no civil court determination in summary judgment on the question of the effect of the pending ecclesiastic proceedings. The interpretation of the very Canons Jane Dixon alleged that Rev. Edwards and the Vestry have violated, the very underpinnings of this suit, are subject to action in a Episcopal Church tribunal. As was the case in Milivojevich, supra, there is a higher tribunal with authority in this matter, a disciplinary mechanism to which bishops are required to adhere in their ordination vow.16 There can be no civil court determination whether any party to this proceedings acts with respect to the acts and transactions complained of are not themselves ultra vires, until resolution of these proceedings. As stated in Jones v. Wolf, supra, these questions of "ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" have not yet been decided by the highest of "church judicatories to which the matter has been carried."17 Accordingly, the District Court not only lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case, but also erred in granting Appellee summary judgment as the facts are not yet fully developed. In essence, this case revolves around Appellee’s desire to circumvent the disciplinary system and rules of governance to which Appellee is sworn to adhere. She has sought to strip Appellants of their rights within their church through resort to the Federal courts. Appellants pointed out that, under Canon IV.7, if Dixon believed that Appellant Rev. Edwards had improperly assumed the Rectorship of St. John’s Parish or improperly usurped her authority, she had the remedy under the internal procedures of the church to so inform Rev. Edwards’ diocesan bishop.18 Under this schema, Fr. Edwards’ bishop would then have to determine whether the conduct complained of would be referred into the disciplinary process. If Rev. Edwards’ diocesan bishop took no action for ninety days, then Appellee would have the ability to inhibit Appellant Edwards from preaching and subject him to discipline in the Diocese of Washington. By following this process, to which she is bound as a bishop of the church, Dixon could obtain precisely the relief she seeks in a portion of her complaint. Appellee took such an action in a letter to Rt. Rev. Jack Leo Iker on the afternoon of May 26, 2001. In fact, Bishop Iker received this communication and is taking action within the Canons of the church to resolve this matter as this appeal was filed. See JA-28. Thus, for purposes of Watson, supra, the matter is at an early stage of the Church’s judicial process, and, therefore, not amenable to summary judgment even if jurisdiction properly lies. Dixon’s apparent desire to circumvent the judicial remedies afforded by the rules of her own church and deprive Appellant Edwards of his due process rights under that system were an inadequate basis for a Federal suit. The District Court’s failure to account for the ongoing proceedings was improper. The issues must be decided in the ecclesiastical courts as has been consistently held by federal appellate courts. More tellingly, the District Court quotes the decision of the Episcopal Church Panel in charges involving Appellee--a decision that raises significant additional factual questions on the side of the Appellants. Opinion at 29. As discussed above, The findings of the Review Panel specifically note that:
In the Matter of the Right Rev’d Jane Holmes Dixon, Report of the Review Committee (Sept. 11, 2001) at 4 (emphasis added). While the Review Panel found that Appellee Dixon’s actions were not contrary to "definitive canonical authority" to warrant ecclesiastical discipline, the Panel noted that the opposite view is based on a good faith interpretation of canon. Id. Accordingly, the Panel effectively gave weight to the Vestry’s position that their contract with Rev. Edwards is based upon a good faith reading of the operating rules of the Episcopal Church and is valid. At the very least, the Review Panel decision that both the Vestry and Appellee had good faith positions raises significant issues that precluded summary judgment and injunction. Appellants believe that it gives rise to causes of action for counterclaim against Appellee for interference in contract in light of the fact that they entered it in good faith. Thus, Appellants believe there is a substantial likelihood of remand on these issues. Finally, the District Court directed the removal of Appellant Edwards and his family from the Rectory by November 30, 2001. Yet, the Vestry had entered into a separate lease agreement with Rev. Edwards that was unrelated to the contract of employment, and which was not subject to the underlying complaint–although it was brought to the attention of the District Court during the motions hearing. JA-748; 794-95 In the face of Appellee’s claims that the lease was "irrelevant" and assertions that the case was not about property, the District Court simply ignored their assertions and the factual and legal bases for them. Opinion at 19. However, the Court not only removed Rev. Edwards and his family from the Rectory -- property belonging in fee simple to the Vestry -- but has barred the Vestry from inviting Rev. Edwards onto the property to conduct religious services generally. In this instance, property was in the complaint, property is in the injunction. Yet, Appellee has no right to control the parish’s real property individually nor does the Rector have the right to control property where title is in the Vestry. Moreover, the right of "access" of a bishop is a right of "visitation" only for so long as the parish is affiliated with the church. Even assuming Appellee Dixon is the Rector in the absence of such, she cannot prevent the Vestry from leasing the property, inviting speakers and so forth. (Indeed, the parish leases its Chapel to an AME Church, which is outside their denomination.) The claim of trust–which the Parish vigorously contests-runs only to the national Church and the Diocese. Yet, the injunction reaches well beyond a claim of access to the property, a claim Dixon simply does not have in her own right or as acting rector. Either there has been an adjudication of property rights without a chance to defend them in derogation of Appellant Vestry’s right to due process, or the Diocese of Washington has been injected into the process, a joinder that defeats diversity jurisdiction Based upon the foregoing, Appellants request that this Court reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in this matter and remand with instructions to dismiss this action in its entirety for at least two reasons: (1) Any court action should await the completion of the church procedures for dispute resolution under the doctrine of judicial deference to ecclesiastical authorities, and (2) The Diocese of Washington is a necessary party, which when joined, destroys the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. In the alternative, Appellants request that this Court reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and injunction in this matter and order the District Court to set aside the injunction previously granted and set this matter in for trial on the merits. Date: December 17, 2001 Respectfully submitted,
Charles H. Nalls, Federal Bar No. 11959
Rufus Peckham, Esquire 729 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 783-6900 (202) 783-6909 (fax) Attorneys for Appellants |
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